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countries.  Polanyi’s historical account of the rise and fall of classic liberalism in Britain 
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themselves from socially destructive market forces.  Recent qualitative applications of this 
idea identify three protective institutions as being the most important—the public sector 
economy, trade unions, and the family.  Using data from 16 Western countries from 1970 to 
2010, this study demonstrates that cross-national and temporal variations in these 
protective institutions explain a considerable amount of the observed patterns of income 
inequality among these countries, helping to explain why some countries have recently 
experienced rising inequality but others have not.  The study ends by arguing that a 
Polanyian perspective provides more analytical and theoretical leverage than other 
sociological approaches to understanding income inequality.   
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INCOME INEQUALITY IN ADVANCED CAPITALISM: 
HOW PROTECTIVE INSTITUTIONS CAN PROMOTE EGALITARIAN SOCIETIES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Income inequality has risen in many but not all affluent countries over recent 
decades.   A widely embraced explanation for this phenomenon comes from studies of labor 
markets in the United States (Acemoglu 1998; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Levy and 
Murnane 2003).  Broadly speaking, these studies hold that “skilled-biased technological 
change”—brought about by the information revolution, globalization, and 
deindustrialization—has heightened demand for high-skilled workers, but diminished 
demand for less-skilled workers, thereby widening the wage-gap between workers with 
different skill levels.  Hence, it is thought that changing market forces underlie most of the 
rising income inequality in the United States, and by extension other similar countries.  
However, this explanation faces a serious empirical anomaly when applied to other 
Western countries.  Simply stated, the empirical anomaly is that the some of the world’s 
most technologically advanced, globally integrated, and deindustrialized countries—such as 
the Nordic countries—are also some of the world’s most egalitarian.   
 Given that economic explanations alone cannot account for the observed cross-
national and temporal variations in income inequality, sociologists and related social 
scientists often emphasize factors lying beyond the strict sphere of the market.  One such 
perspective views class-based political struggles, and their effects on social welfare policies 
and labor market institutions, as key determinants of income inequality (Bradley et al 2003; 
Brady and Leicht 2008; Mahler 2004).  Another perspective emphasizes changes in the size 
of economically vulnerable populations, such as single mothers and the elderly, and how 
these demographic trends may affect the distribution of income (Esping-Andersen 2007; 
Kollmeyer 2013; McLanahan and Percheski 2008; Western, Bloome and Percheski 2008).   
Overall, the focus on non-market institutions is especially promising, largely because such 
institutions vary considerably across countries otherwise experiencing similar levels of 
“skilled-biased technological change.”  
 The present study seeks to combine these sociological approaches into an 
overarching Polanyian account of how non-market institutions affect the national 
distribution of income in advanced capitalist countries.  In his well‐known analysis of the 
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rise and fall of classic liberalism, Polanyi (1944) detailed how the drive to expand the scope 
of markets in Britain destabilized and nearly overwhelmed the larger society in which these 
markets were embedded.  A particularly interesting sociological aspect of his analysis 
centers on the ways in which broadly defined social groups sought to shield themselves 
from destructive market forces by building “protective institutions.” In this way, Polanyi 
saw the mobilization for social protection as central to the process of capitalist 
development.  This idea has recently been extended by Ringmar (2005), who identifies the 
state, guilds and trade unions, and the family as being historically the most important 
protective institutions in Western and East Asian societies.  These protective institutions, 
he argues, are important because they help to reconcile capitalism’s need for dynamism and 
private gain with society’s need for stability and social justice (see also Breen 1997).   
  In what follows, this study draws on Polanyi to argue that changes in three 
“protective institutions” largely account for the unique patterns of income inequality found 
across Western countries over recent decades.  Although Polanyi’s ideas have been used to 
study the dynamics of social stratification in socialist and post-socialist societies (Nee 1996; 
Szelenyi 1978; Szelenyi and Kostello 1996), and to argue that institutional constraints on 
markets can actually improve an economy’s overall performance (Streek 1998, 2008), to 
the author’s knowledge no study uses such a perspective to assess income inequality.  I 
begin the study by documenting recent changes in income inequality in advanced capitalist 
countries and then developing the argument that three protective institutions—the public 
sector economy, trade unions, and the family—play crucial roles in shaping the national 
distribution of income.  Next, I empirically confirm the relationship between protective 
institutions and income inequality with data on 16 Western countries observed 
intermittedly from 1970 to 2010.  Then, comparing outcomes across countries during the 
2000s, I show that cross-national variations in these protective institutions map onto cross-
national differences in income inequality.  Finally, I conclude by arguing that a Polanyian 
perspective offers more analytical and theoretical leverage than other sociological 
approaches to understanding income inequality.  
 
CHANGES IN INCOME INEQUALITY, 1970 - 2010 
 To contextualize the present study, it is instructive to begin by noting that income 
inequality varies substantially across advanced capitalist countries, even though these 
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countries are similar in many other ways.  This degree of variation is shown in figure 1, 
which portrays net income inequality estimates from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
(2014) for the 16 countries used in this study over recent decades.  The LIS gathers detailed 
data from nationally representative household surveys, and then harmonizes these data to 
yield estimates that are methodologically consistent across countries and across years.  The 
national surveys are conducted approximately every five years, starting for some countries 
in early 1970s and for others in the mid-1980s.  The resulting estimates, expressed as Gini 
coefficients multiplied by 100, account for the moderating effects of taxes and social 
transfers, meaning that they reflect the distribution of disposable rather than gross income. 
 These data illustrate that, in at least two ways, the United States and (to a lesser 
degree) the United Kingdom are anomalous.  First, these two countries experienced 
significant and sustained upturns in inequality starting in the early 1980s, yet similar 
patterns of change are hard to detect in other countries. Rather, the estimates from the LIS 
suggest that most countries have experienced trendless fluctuations or modest changes in 
their levels of income inequality.  Second, the United States and the United Kingdom have 
considerably higher levels of income inequality than the other countries in the sample.  To 
illustrate this point, the highest level of income inequality within the sample is denoted by a 
dashed line, which runs across each national plot.  The highest level of inequality—a Gini 
coefficient of 37.8—was recorded in the United States in 2007.  Except for recent estimates 
from the United Kingdom (which has had Gini coefficients close to 35), the other countries 
in the sample do not have income inequality of this magnitude.   
[Insert figure 1 about here.] 
  
 How can the cross-national and temporal patterns shown in figure 1 be explained?  
The present study now turns to the argument that the distribution of income in advanced 
capitalist countries is substantially shaped by protective institutions that shield individuals 
from the full force of the market.  These protective institutions have long historical roots, 
but became firmly entrenched as universal pillars of the socio-economic order of Western 
capitalism during the mid-20th century.  Where they have remained robust, income 
inequality has remained at modest levels.  But where they have weakened, income 
inequality has risen accordingly.  For the United States and the United Kingdom in 
particular, their unusually high levels of income inequality are linked not to their greater 
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exposure to globalization or technological change, but rather to the growing weakness of 
their protective institutions, which in prior decades had helped to kept market-generated 
inequality at bay.   
 
PROTECTIVE INSTITUTIONS AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
           Many historically prominent social scientists have concluded that capitalist markets 
do many things very well, but generating social stability and economic equality is not one of 
them (Keynes 1936; Marx 1867/2000; Polanyi 1944).  On this subject, Polanyi’s (1944) 
renowned analysis of the rise and fall of classic liberalism in Britain has been particularly 
influential.  He held that, until the “utopian” efforts of 19th-century Britain, no society had 
attempted to build an economy wholly around free markets.  Instead, the historic norm was 
that economies used multiple distributive systems, with markets typically playing auxiliary 
roles to distributive systems based on reciprocity and redistribution (see also Polanyi 
1968).  The paradox for 19th-century Britain was that the expansion of the market produced 
unparalleled wealth on one hand, but a cascade of poverty and social dislocations on the 
other.  As the market economy spread across the West, this same pattern of expanding 
wealth and expanding poverty was replicated in other countries. Eventually, leading 
capitalist powers developed systematic ways of addressing these socio-economic 
problems—for example, the New Deal in the United States, the Beveridgean welfare state in 
Britain, and corporatism in German and Italy (Mann 1996), but only after the free-market 
nearly destroyed Western society. 
 Famously, Polanyi described the classic liberal era in Britain as being shaped by a 
“double movement” in which attempts to expand markets by some were met with attempts 
to protect society from those markets by others.  Although varied in form, all attempts at 
social protection shared the common logic of seeking to shield some segment of society 
from the market.  For the purposes of the present study, Polanyi makes two important 
points about the development of protective institutions.  First, Polanyi notes that some 
attempts at social protection were ill-conceived and counterproductive.  The Speenhamland 
system was notable in this regard.  Used in many parts of Britain during the early-19th 
century, this system relied on local parishes to supplement the incomes of workers whose 
wages fell below the poverty line.  Although well intended, Speenhamland’s ultimately 
effect was to exacerbate the very problem it sought to overcome (see also Block and Somers 
2003).  This occurred because many employers reduced their wages further once they 
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realized that local parishes would cover the difference, with the result being a reinforcing 
spiral of falling wages and rising demand for social protection.  Hence, a key milestone in 
modern capitalism, according to Polanyi, was the repeal of Speenhamland in 1834, since 
this parliamentary act laid the foundation for a labor market governed by supply and 
demand.      
 Second, in a significant deviation from other critics of capitalism, Polanyi argues 
that the mobilization for social protection was undertaken not by the working class in 
particular, but by broad cross-sections of society, even though the latter may have been the 
biggest beneficiary of this social movement.  In taking this position, Polanyi significantly 
differentiates himself from the Marxist tradition, which long views the working class and its 
struggles against capitalist exploitation as the primary engine of progressive social change.  
Polanyi bases his argument on the notion that unfettered markets imperil not just workers 
and natural resources, but “the whole organization of capitalistic production itself” 
(19944:138).  Hence, at different times and in different ways, the emergence of markets in 
19th-century Britain threatened farmers, landlords, manufacturers, traders, artisan, trade 
unionists, unskilled laborers, and the poor.  Often, cross-sections of individuals from these 
groups and classes pushed for specific interventions, such as the regulation of working 
conditions, restrictions on the use of land, or tariffs in support of domestic industry.  At 
other times, cross-sections mobilized for the development of important non-market 
institutions, which could provide the general public with important services not being 
adequately provided by the market.  This includes services related to public safety, 
sanitation, health care, education, transportation, culture and recreation, among many 
others.  In sum, Polanyi maintains that an economy that allocates the factors of production 
purely through the market mechanism threatens the very fabric of society, and hence the 
mobilization against these threats are often broad based, although clearly shaped by the 
class interests involved.  
 These ideas on the interplay between markets and society have influenced 
sociologists interested in understanding how capitalist societies reconcile conflicting social 
and economic imperatives (Ringmar 2005; Breen 1997).  In this regard, Ringmar’s (2005) 
historical analysis of Western and East Asian societies holds that prosperous countries find 
ways to empower markets on one hand, but protect their citizens from undesirable market 
force on the other hand.  He concludes that this form of political economy—in which the 
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effects of markets are buffered by non-market institutions—is not without its problems, but 
works reasonably well most of the time.  Like Polanyi, Ringmar believes that capitalist 
societies can use a variety of strategies to balance social and economic imperatives, but he 
highlights three protective institutions as being the most important—the state, guilds and 
trade unions, and the family.  Each developed and evolved over considerable periods of 
time, but by the post-war period they had become firmly entrenched as universal features 
of the socio-economic order of these societies. 
 Similar ideas can be found elsewhere in the social sciences.  For example, in 
economics, some scholars argue that “equalizing institutions” (Levy 1998) or 
“countervailing power” (Galbraith 1952) are important mechanisms for offsetting market 
excesses and producing stable economic growth. In international relations, scholars use the 
term “embedded liberalism” to describe the post-war international economic order (Ruggie 
1982).  This economic order was “liberal” in that it promoted free trade, but “embedded” in 
that it constrained international capital mobility as a means of preserving the domestic 
policy autonomy of individual states.    
 The section below further outlines the rationale for why the three protective 
institutions identified by Ringmar should help to mitigate income inequality.  My analysis 
slightly reframes these protective institutions by focusing on (1) the public sector economy, 
(2) trade unions and industrial relations systems, and (3) the dual-income family.   
 
Public Sector Economy 
 Polanyi’s (1944, 1968) perspective on economy-society relations provides a useful 
starting point for thinking about how the public sector economy may produce less income 
inequality than the private sector economy.  For Polanyi, private markets are governed by 
the logic of “economizing”—meaning that market participants seek to increase their 
material well-being by choosing courses of action that maximizes their gains and minimizes 
their costs.  In contrast, the public sector economy follows a different logic.  In the 
Polanyian sense, it is governed not by the economizing behaviour of myriad individuals, but 
rather by centralized authorities seeking to fulfil certain social and political needs.  From 
this insight, one can reasonably argue that markets and the public sector constitute unique 
distributive systems within contemporary capitalism, with each likely yielding distinct 
patterns of income inequality. Here a crucial point is that economic activity in consumer 
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markets is based on competition and the pursuit of private gain, which should create 
abundant opportunities for individual differentiation and hence relatively high levels of 
income inequality. Conversely, economic activity in the public sector is oriented toward 
fulfilling social needs with resources obtained through taxation. The resulting economic 
activity, in turn, should create fewer opportunities for individual differentiation and hence 
relatively lower levels of income inequality. To the degree that these contentions are 
correct, one would expect income inequality to be high in advanced capitalist countries 
with small public sectors. 
 There is sound empirical evidence supporting this theoretical contention.  Recent 
quantitative studies find that, at least in democratic societies, public sector spending 
reduces income inequality (Boyd 1988; Kollmeyer 2012; Lee 2005). This ostensibly occurs 
because democratic states obtain revenue through progressive taxation, but then spend the 
resulting resources in ways that benefit citizens across the social hierarchy. This is thought 
to redistribute income from high- to low-income earners.  An important caveat centers on 
democracy.  In his analysis of 64 non-communist countries over the period of 1970–1994, 
Lee (2005) finds that public sector spending exacerbates income inequality in non-
democratic countries, but reduces it in democratic countries. The difference is attributed to 
divergent spending priorities, with nondemocratic states often using public resources to 
promote the narrow interests of elites and favored industries, but democratic states often 
using public resources to advance broad interests or to alleviate poverty and inequality. 
 
Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining Structures 
 As important protective institutions, trade unions have historically offered workers 
the possibility that they can bend market outcomes toward their interests.  The lone worker 
must accept prevailing market conditions, even if those conditions are heavily weighted 
against him or her.  But large groups of workers, acting in a coordinated fashion, can exert 
some influence over market conditions, changing them in ways that improve their collective 
welfare.  Hence, a prominent view in the social sciences holds that economic outcomes in 
advanced capitalist countries reflect not only anonymous market forces, but also the 
organizational power of workers (e.g. Esping-Anderson 1985; Bradley et al 2003; Korpi 
1983).   
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 There are at least three reasons why strong trade unions should lower national 
income inequality.  (1) By amplifying the bargaining power of workers, trade unions tend to 
enlarge labor’s share of national income, meaning that more of the income generated from 
the economy ends up in the form of wages and salary rather than profits and rents (Kristal 
2010; Rubin 1986; Wallace, Leicht, and Raffalovich 1999).  (2) Trade unions tend to reduce 
the gap between high- and low-income workers (Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002; Rueda 
and Pontusson 2000).  This occurs because the logic of collective action generates 
preferences for compact wage scales, in which some of the potential incomes of high-
earning members are sacrificed in exchange for higher incomes for low-earning members.   
(3) By affecting prevailing social norms, trade unions can influence wage inequality in non-
unionized sectors of the economy.  As Western and Rosenfeld (2011) argue, trade unions 
promote, defuse and reinforce societal views that sanction economic equality as a desired 
social outcome.  Hence, when trade unions are powerful, norms sanctioning equality 
become deeply ingrained in the workplace, helping to curtail wage dispersion in unionized 
and non-unionized sectors of the economy alike.   
 Furthermore, the systems in which wages are set and economic policy formed are 
thought to influence the national income distribution.  In corporatist systems, such as those 
found in Sweden and Austria, decisions about wages and related issues are made through 
tripartite negotiations at the national level, with the resulting decisions being uniformly 
implemented by local employers and trade unions.  In decentralized systems, such as those 
found in the United States and the United Kingdom, individual workers or local trade 
unions negotiate directly with local employers, leaving trade unions with little direct 
influence over national economic policy.  Importantly, by giving workers the institutional 
capacity to consider their common interests, corporatism is thought to generate collective 
preferences for equality.  This idea is supported by numerous studies, each finding that 
corporatism generates relatively compact wage distributions (Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 
2002; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Wallerstein 1999) and reduces overall levels of income 
inequality (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Bradley et al. 2003; Mahler 2004). 
 
Family Formations and Female Labor Market Participation  
 The family is an important and long-standing protective institution, because it 
allows for the pooling of incomes among multiple income earners and the redistribution of 
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income from working to non-working members of society.  Family formations have varied 
across history, but during the mid-20th century, strong social forces led most families in the 
West to adopt the male-breadwinner model, in which the father participated in the labor 
market and the mother engaged in unpaid domestic work.  For the reasons discussed 
below, recent movements away from this family formation are  likely to have significant 
distributional consequences, with the specific effect depending on the particular 
composition of changes occurring in each country.  
 One prominent familial change is the growing prevalence of families headed by 
single mothers.  This trend should heighten national income inequality for several reasons.  
(1) Given growth in the number of dual-income families, families headed by single mothers 
have one less source of income than many other families and households.  (2) The 
persistence of a gender wage gap means that the earnings of single mothers will, on 
average, lag behind the earnings of comparably situated men.  Finally, (3) at least in the 
United States, single mothers tend to be less educated than other women (McLanahan and 
Percheski 2008).  The combined effect of these three factors— more dual-income families, 
lower pay for women,  and low educational attainments of single mothers—means that 
many single-mother families will have household incomes below the national median.  
Hence, as their numbers grow, national income inequality should rise due to the 
concomitant increase in the number of lower-income families.  This disequalizing effect is 
well documented for the United States (e.g. Treas 1987; Moller, Alderson, and Nielsen 2009; 
Western, Bloome and Percheski 2008), and seems to occur more generally across advanced 
capitalist countries (Kollmeyer 2013). 
 A second important familial change, occurring over recent decades, is the steady 
rise in female labor market participation.  Although contested (see Schwartz 2010), strong 
evidence suggests that this trend has an equalizing effect on the national income 
distribution.  Here the theoretical explanation is that increasing numbers of women in the 
paid workforce spreads income more widely across society and provides additional (and 
much-needed) income to many lower-income families, with the combined effect being a 
reduction in national income inequality.  Numerous studies on the United States support 
this view, although the distributional effects appear to vary from decade to decade, 
depending on the types of women drawn into the workforce (Treas 1987; Moller, Alderson, 
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and Nielsen 2009; Western, Bloome and Percheski 2008).  Recent cross-national research 
yields similar conclusions (Kollmeyer 2013).  
 Finally, a related demographic factor with distributional consequences is the 
changing size of economically inactive populations.  A basic assumption of demographic 
approaches to studying income inequality is that national populations can be divided into 
distinct groups—in this case those who are economically active and those who are 
economically inactive—and that each group will have an associated mean income (see 
Gustafsson and  Johansson 1999; Western, Bloome and Percheski 2008).   For the present 
study, it can be assumed that economically inactive groups will have lower mean incomes 
than economically active groups.  From this assumption, it follows that if the relative size of 
the economically inactive populations increases, or if their relative mean income falls, then 
national distribution of income will be more unequal.  Scholars such as Gustafsson and  
Johansson (1999) have generated compelling evidence of this distributional effect.  For the 
present study, this factor should be considered largely because the countries in the sample 
have aging populations, which should result in more households comprised of economically 
inactive retirees with incomes below the national median.  
 
CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION IN PROTECTIVE INSTITUTION STRENGTH  
 By the post-war period, the three protective institutions described above had 
become important pillars of the socio-economic order of advanced capitalism, helping to 
secure several decades of stable economic growth and widespread prosperity.  Of great 
importance to the present study is the fact that (1) the strength of these protective 
institutions vary considerably across advanced capitalist countries, and that (2) this cross-
national variation has become more pronounced over recent decades.  These two points 
can be seen in table 1, which displays averages measures of the strength of key protective 
institutions from the 1970s and the 2000s for the 16 countries in the sample.   For each of 
the four measures, there is considerable variation across the sample, and this variation 
appears to map onto levels of income inequality.  For instance, Denmark, with some of the 
lowest income inequality in the sample, has some of the most favorable scores on all 
measures except the percentage of children living with single mothers.  Conversely, the 
United States, with the highest income inequality in the sample, has some of the least 
favorable scores on all measures except female labor market participation.  Furthermore, 
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these differences are generally becoming more pronounced.  This can been seen in the 
sample standard deviations, which are larger in the 2000s than the 1970s for all measures 
except female labor market participation.  
[Insert table 1 about here.] 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: PANEL DATA  
 To test my argument that protective institutions are important determinants of 
income inequality, and hence can help to explain why some countries have recently 
experienced rising inequality while others have not, I collect data on 16 Western countries 
from 1970 to 2010.   The 16 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.   The data set is unbalanced, because income 
inequality estimates from the LIS, the best source for such data, are taken only two or three 
times per decade.  Consequentially, the dataset contains a maximum of 131 observations 
per variable.  Given that the measurement of study’s variables are straightforward, and 
given that I wish to focus on the empirical findings rather than the data and statistical 
methods, I streamline this section by presenting information about the variables in table 2, 
but not discussing their construction in the text as well.   I also streamline the discussion of 
the estimating strategy used below. 
[Insert table 2 about here.] 
  
 The empirical analysis begins by examining the bivariate relationships between 
income inequality and the three protective institutions discussed above.   As shown in 
figure 2, these bivariate relationships are depicted by the directional pattern of the scatter 
plots, by the prediction lines fitted to these scatter plots, and by the associated Pearson 
correlation coefficients (r).  These bivariate analyses reveal that net income inequality has a 
strong and negative correlation with public sector (%GDP) and trade union density.  The 
strength of these associations, as depicted by the Pearson correlation coefficient, are 
reasonably strong and very similar to one another (r = -.57 and r = -.65, respectively).  
These bivariate analyses suggest that changes in family composition affect income 
inequality as well.  In particular, the data show that net income inequality is positively 
correlated with % of Children Living with Single Mothers (r = 0.28), but negatively correlated 
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with Female Labor Market Participation (r = -0.28).  Overall, these bivariate relationships 
suggest that all three of these protective institutions do indeed have important 
distributional effects. 
[Insert figure 2 about here.] 
  
 The study now examines these relationships with standard panel regression 
techniques.   Put succinctly, my estimating strategy uses country-specific error terms to 
account for unmeasured cross-sectional effects, a battery of year-dummy variables to 
account for unmeasured temporal effects, and panel-clustered robust standard errors to 
account for serial correlation and groupwise heteroscedasticity.  These steps create a 
random effects (RE) model (which is estimated by generalized least squares) with panel-
clustered robust standard errors.  This estimating strategy has been used in prominent 
studies of income inequality, which also use repeat observation of several Western 
countries (Alderson. and Nielsen 2002; Kollmeyer 2012, 2013; Brady and Leicht 2008; 
Gustafsson and Johansson 1999).  These adaptations are necessary because ordinary least 
squares regression assumes that the observations comprising the sample are unrelated, but 
with panel data, many observations share temporal and cross-sectional linkages.  My RE 
model accounts for these linkages, as  well as serial correlation and groupwise 
heteroscedasticity (both of which can inflate standard errors if not properly addressed). 
The regression analysis proceeds first by examining the distributional effects of the three 
protective institutions separately, and then examining all of the protective institutions 
simultaneously.  
 Table 3 shows results from seven RE regression models, each assessing how various 
protective institutions affect net income inequality. Model 1 begins by introducing a simple 
bivariate model, in which the size of the public sector is regressed against net income 
inequality.  Based on the discussion above, the expectation is that the size of the public 
sector should be inversely related income inequality, because at least in democratic 
countries, the public sector economy is thought to be inherently redistributive.  Consistent 
with this expectation, the parameter estimate for public sector (%GDP) is negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that income inequality falls when the public sector 
economy expands.  Model 2 extends this simple bivariate model by introducing a measure 
of the average generosity of three social welfare programs—unemployment, disability, and 
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old-age insurance—which are used in all of the 16 countries in the sample.  Generosity is 
measured as the percentage of a worker’s prior income that is replaced by the social 
insurance program.  As expected, under this multivariate model, the parameter estimates 
for both public sector (%GDP) and generosity of welfare benefits are negative and 
statistically significant.  This result suggests that, net of the equalizing effects of the public 
sector economy, generous social protections also exert downward pressure on income 
inequality. 
[Insert table 3 about here.] 
 The next regression model assesses how trade union strength and the composition 
of the industrial relations system affect national income inequality.  Specifically, model 3 
finds a negative and statistically significant parameter estimate for trade union density, 
suggesting that income inequality falls as the unionized percentage of the workforce 
increases.   Model 4 extends this finding by considering whether the characteristics of the 
industrial relations systems used in particular countries influence the distribution of 
income.  This is done by adding two measures of corporatism to the existing model of trade 
union strength.  As expected, the result show that trade union density, centralized wage 
bargaining, and policy bargaining all have negative parameter estimates.  Unexpectedly, 
however, the parameter estimate for centralized wage bargaining is not statistically 
significant, an outcome that changes in the full model discussed below. 
 The next set of regression models assesses whether recent changes in familial 
structure are affecting the national distribution of income.  The main contention is that the 
family often functions as a protective institution, since it can pool incomes across multiple 
earners and redistribute income from working to non-working members of society.  In 
particular, this contention rests on two interrelated expectations: (1) that increases in 
female paid employment should reduce income inequality (since it should enhance the 
capacity of families to pool incomes), but (2) that increases in households headed by single 
mothers should heighten income inequality (since such families cannot pool incomes and 
face entrenched barriers in the labor market).  To begin to test these expectations, model 5 
isolates the distributional effects of female labor market participation.  As anticipated, this 
parameter estimate is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the growing 
numbers of women in the paid workforce have helped to moderate income equality over 
recent decades.  Model 6 extends this finding and tests the second expectation by 
14 
 
introducing the % of children living with single mothers as well as other demographic 
measures.  As expected, this expanded model shows that female labor market participation 
is negative and statistically significant, but that the % of children living with single mothers 
is positive and statistically significant.  Hence, the two trends have offsetting distributional 
effects.  
 Model 6 also controls for the size of a country’s economically inactive population.  
As demonstrated by Gustafsson and Johansson (1999), economically inactive populations 
are likely to heighten income inequality.  This occurs presumably because their average 
incomes are lower than those of economically active populations.  But this may occur for 
more idiosyncratic reasons as well.  Here the main factor is that the LIS weights each 
household’s income by the square root of the number of its members, resulting in what the 
LIS calls “equivalent household income.”  Given that children increase household size 
without increasing household income, large populations of children should put upward 
pressure on the LIS’s estimates of income inequality.   Hence, the expectation is that an 
increase in the economically inactive population (whether it come from children or 
pensioners) should generate a disequalizing effect on the distribution of income.  The 
results fromn model 6, however, are inconsistent with this expectation, as the parameter 
estimates for  population under 16 and population over 65 are statistically insignificant.  
Importantly, this result changes in the final model. 
 It is also worth noting that the magnitude of the parameter estimate for female labor 
market participation is larger in the multivariate model than the bivariate model.  This 
outcome likely reflects the presence of a confounding association between paid female 
employment and single motherhood, as each effects net income inequality.  Most likely, 
some women are entering the paid workforce precisely because they are single parents and 
cannot rely on the incomes of their spouses or partners for financial support.  Hence, once 
the model accounts for the disequalizing effect of single motherhood, the remaining 
equalizing effect of female employment on income inequality becomes larger.   
 Lastly, model 7 simultaneously estimates the parameters for all variables appearing 
in the previous six models.  As one would expected, some of the parameter estimates are 
smaller under this more comprehensive model since confounding factors are held constant.  
This is the case, for example, for trade union density.  Its parameter estimate fell from b = -
0.089 in model 4 to b = -0.049 in model 7.  Notably, the parameter estimates for the 
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economically inactive populations change as well. While estimated to be statistically 
insignificant in model 6, the parameters for population under 16 and population over 65 are 
now positive and statistically significant, suggesting that economically inactive populations 
do indeed heighten income inequality.  This changing result is likely due to confounding 
effects among population under 16 and population over 65 and other independent variables 
in the model.  For example, the size of public sector economy and the generosity of social 
insurance is associated with services and transfers specifically targeting young and old 
populations.  Also trade unions strength may affect the ability of workers to receive a 
“family wage” to cover the costs of children, or to bolster pensions for their retirement.  
Once the comprehensive model accounts for these factors, the remaining disequalizing 
effects associated with economically inactive populations manifest more clearly.  
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA 
 The empirical analysis ends by examining my hypothesis from a cross-sectional 
perspective.  In essence, this perspective asks whether net income inequality is relatively 
low in countries where protective institutions are strong, but relatively high in countries 
where protective institutions are weak.  Table 4 addresses this question by comparing 
levels of net income inequality to the strength of protective institutions for each of the 16 
countries in the sample.  The measures are based on average scores from observations 
taking in the 2000s.  This is done to create a cross-section free from distortions arising from 
short-term fluctuations, but one that still reasonably approximates the current state of 
affairs in these countries.  To more clearly depict the relationship under consideration, 
table 4 arrays the 16 countries (from highest to lowest) based on the Gini coefficient of net 
income inequality.    
[Insert table 4 about here.] 
  
 Consistent with the regression results discussed above, table 4 reveals strong links 
between the distribution of net income and the strength of three protective institutions.  
For example, the United States not only has the highest level of income inequality in the 
sample, but also very weak protective institutions relative to the sample.  In fact, out of 16 
countries, the United States has the second smallest public sector, the second lowest trade 
union density, and second highest percentage of children living with single mothers.  These 
16 
 
disequalizing effects, however, are slightly mitigated by the US’s level of female labor 
market participation, which is close to the sample mean. Overall, this cross-sectional view 
strongly suggests that the United States has high income inequality largely because it has 
weak protective institutions. 
 The congruence between income inequality and the strength of protective 
institutions holds not just for the United States, but for countries at the other end of the 
income-inequality spectrum.  As my general argument anticipates, the Nordic countries not 
only have low levels of income inequality, but also robust protective institutions.  In 
particular, they have large public sector economies, highly unionized labor forces, and high 
levels of female labor market participation.  These equalizing effects, however, are slightly 
undermined by the large numbers of children living with single mothers—an outcome that 
prevents net income inequality in these countries from being even lower. Nonetheless, the 
strong congruence between the strength of these protective institutions and prevailing 
levels of net income inequality hold across the sample.   
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Despite enormous influence on the social sciences, Polanyi’s ideas about society-
market relations have received scant attention from scholars interested in income 
inequality.  The rare exception has been a handful of studies on social stratification in 
socialist and post-socialist societies (Nee 1996; Szelenyi 1978; Szelenyi and Kostello 1996).  
This oversight is unfortunate since Polanyi’s account of how capitalist societies protect 
themselves from socially destructive market forces is highly relevant to the study of income 
inequality.  Hoping to pod the literature in this direction, the present study is the first to 
assess income inequality from a Polanyian perspective.  Extending Ringmar’s (2005) 
qualitative analysis of protective institutions, my main contention is that cross-national and 
temporal variations in three protective institutions—the public sector economy, trade 
unions,  and the family—largely explain observed variations in national income inequality 
across affluent Western countries.  Using a range of statistical methods, I empirically 
support this contention with data on 16 Western countries observed intermittedly between 
1970 and 2010. 
 This study contributes to the study of income inequality by conceptualizing the 
public sector economy, trade unions, and the family as protective institutions with 
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significant distributional effects.  In Polanyi’s account of capitalist society, the development 
of non-market institutions within the economy is not an aberration in an otherwise self-
regulating system of market exchange.  Instead, it is part and parcel of capitalist society, 
largely because these non-market institutions play indispensible roles in reconciling 
tensions between market and social imperatives.  Without social protection, market forces 
are likely to undermine the workings of the economy and society alike.  Importantly, this 
led Polanyi to contend that protective institutions are not necessarily instruments of 
working class power, but rather mechanisms to stabilize society and improve the well-
being of people from diverse class backgrounds.  Drawing on this theoretical perspective, 
my study empirically demonstrates that protective institutions linked to the state, civil 
society, and the family can generate a relatively egalitarian distribution of income within 
the context of capitalism.  Although no country in the study is uniformly strong across all 
protective institutions, the data assembled here clearly shows a pattern between national 
income inequality and the robustness of these protective institutions.   
 Potentially, this Polanyian perspective can offer more analytical and theoretical 
leverage than other perspectives on income inequality.  Many sociological studies of income 
inequality draw upon “power resource theory” to explicate the causal mechanisms shaping 
the national income distribution.   As applied by Bradley et al (2003), this perspective 
extends Marxian notions of class conflict to posit that the organizational strength of the 
working class and the power of left-labor parties are crucial determinants of income 
inequality.   As applied by Brady and Leicht (2008), this perspective also considers how the 
power of capitalist elites—wielded through right political parties—can shape income 
inequality.  Hence, in total, “power resource theory” views the balance of class power—
which then shapes trade unions, political parties, and welfare states—as the primary driver 
of distributional outcomes.  Implicitly, such a perspective highlights the working class as 
the social actor whose agency pushes back against the extremes of capitalism and reshapes 
the national income distribution in a more egalitarian fashion.  This infers that income 
inequality should be relatively low when the working class is organized and motivated, but 
relatively high when the working class is disorganized and indifferent.   
 However, viewing the working class’ organizational and political power as the 
linchpin to distributional dynamics may be unwarranted.  As some scholars note, the 
contemporary working class is less politically active and less uniformly left in its political 
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orientation than the working class of previous generations (i.e. Hechter 2004).  Partially for 
this reason, Brady and Leicht call attention to the political right’s capacity to mould the 
distribution of income in their favour.  Here one of their main points is that, unlike large 
segments of the working class in some countries today, capitalist elites and their political 
allies have not demobilized around class issues, and hence their political power should still 
be positively linked to income inequality.     
 By contrast, the Polanyian perspective used in this study takes another view of 
class.  Although Polanyi realized the importance of class in shaping society, he contended 
that “class interests offer only a limited explanation of long-run movements in society” 
(1944: 159).  He saw protective institutions as being indicative of this general trend.  In 
practical terms, this means that diverse social groups—often more than particular classes—
are the champions of protective institutions.  For example, in Britain today, the public 
sector receives political support not only from the working class, but also from sizeable 
segments of the middle class.  The latter’s support is linked to the fact the British public 
sector employs the vast majority of the country’s doctors and university lecturers as well as 
large numbers of other middle-class professionals.  Furthermore, many of these public 
sector professionals are trade union members.  Consequently, the public sector and trade 
unions often receive support from cross-sections of the middle and working classes, even 
though members of these classes might differ on a range of other contentious issues.  
Similar points could be made about the family as a protective institution transversing class 
politics.  For example, one could easily imagine the wealthy pursuing policies that limit the 
prevalence of single parenthood (thereby reducing inequality), but pursue policies that 
shrink the public sector economy (thereby increasing inequality).  Under such a scenario, 
the link between class and protective institutions is not always straightforward. 
 Overall, the Polanyian perspective generally contends that protective institutions 
moderate the distribution of income (which has pronounced class implications), but that 
the political support for these institutions can contravene traditional notions of class 
struggle.  Such an account of class—that it matters but is not always deceive—seems 
consistent with the general thrust of politics in many countries today.  In sum, the 
Polanyian perspective places the sociological study of income inequality, as it manifests in 
contemporary capitalist societies, on sound theoretical foundation.  It does this by allowing 
for the possibility that diverse social actors, not just the working class, provide crucial 
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support for protective institutions.  This happens because a broad swath of society’s 
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Table 1: Variation in the Strength of Protective Institutions: Average Scores from the 1970s and the 2000s for 16 Advanced 
Capitalist Countries. 






 Labor Market  
 
Single Mothers 
  1970s 2000s Δ   1970s 2000s Δ   1970s 2000s Δ   1980s* 2000s Δ 
Australia 16.1 17.5 1.4 
 
48.1 21.0 -27.2 
 
49.0 68.4 19.4 
 
9.6 16.8 7.2 
Austria 16.5 18.7 2.2 
 
59.6 32.4 -27.2 
 
48.4 66.0 17.6 
 
13.0 12.1 -0.9 
Belgium 20.0 22.7 2.8 
 
49.6 51.7 2.1 
 
42.8 58.8 16.1 
 
4.1 10.3 6.2 
Canada 21.1 19.7 -1.4 
 
33.4 30.0 -3.4 
 
48.7 72.7 24.0 
 
9.3 14.0 4.7 
Denmark 23.3 26.7 3.4 
 
68.2 70.9 2.7 
 
63.0 76.1 13.0 
 
12.0 15.6 3.6 
Finland 16.9 22.3 5.4 
 
62.7 71.7 8.9 
 
65.3 73.1 7.8 
 
9.0 11.8 2.8 
France 19.1 23.6 4.6 
 
21.3 7.8 -13.5 
 
50.7 66.1 15.4 
 
6.6 9.1 2.5 
Germany 19.4 18.9 -0.4 
 
33.8 21.4 -12.4 
 
50.4 67.3 17.0 
 
6.6 15.2 8.6 
Ireland 19.1 17.0 -2.1 
 
56.3 34.5 -21.8 
 
34.3 60.6 26.3 
 
5.3 18.2 12.9 
Italy 16.4 19.8 3.4 
 
45.6 34.0 -11.6 
 
35.2 50.1 14.8 
 
4.2 6.7 2.5 
Netherlands 22.0 24.9 2.8 
 
36.9 20.9 -16.0 
 
32.1 69.7 37.6 
 
7.3 10.5 3.2 
Norway 18.3 20.7 2.3 
 
54.3 54.3 0.0 
 
66.1 75.8 9.7 
 
10.1 13.8 3.8 
Sweden 24.8 26.4 1.6 
 
73.4 75.6 2.3 
 
66.1 76.2 10.1 
 
11.0 17.9 6.9 
Switzerland 9.2 11.3 2.1 
 
30.8 19.5 -11.3 
 
53.0 78.6 25.6 
 
6.9 7.2 0.3 
United Kingdom 20.1 21.0 0.9 
 
46.7 28.1 -18.6 
 
54.1 69.0 14.9 
 
9.4 21.7 12.3 
United States 17.3 16.0 -1.2   24.0 12.1 -11.9   53.0 69.7 16.7   17.8 20.6 2.8 
  
               Sample Mean  18.7 20.5 1.7   46.5 36.3 -10.3   51.4 68.6 17.3   8.8 14.1 5.3 
Sample St. Dev. 3.78 4.04 0.26  15.37 20.98 5.61  10.56 7.36 -3.20  3.74 4.61 0.87 
Note: Δ equals the percentage-point change between the 1970s average and the 2000s average.   * Due to data limitations, this 
column reports averages from the 1970s and 1980s combined.  See table 2 for descriptions and sources of data.
25 
 
Table 2: Variable Descriptions and Data Sources 
Variable Description and Source 
Net income inequality Gini coefficient of net income inequality (x 100). Data from 
Luxembourg Income Study (2014.) 
 
Public sector (%GDP) Annual value of government expenditures on goods and services 
as percentage of GDP.  Data from OECD (2014a). 
 
Generosity of welfare 
benefits 
Average replacement wage for unemployment, disability, and old-
age social insurance programs.  Data from Scruggs et al (2014). 
 




Measure of centralization and coordination in wage bargaining, 
ranging from “5” (economy-wide negotiations) to  “1” (firm-level 




Measure of official trade union participation in development of 
social and economic policy, with “3” equalling full participation, 
“2” equalling partial participation, and “1” equalling no 
participation. Data from Visser (2014). 
 
Female labor market 
participation 
Percentage of women aged 15-64  in paid workforce.  Data from 
OECD (2014b). 
 
% of children with 
single mothers 
Percentage of children in households headed by single mothers. 
Data from Luxembourg Income Study (2014). 
 
Population < 15  
years old 
Percentage of population aged 15 years or younger. Data from 
OECD (2014b). 
 
Population < 65  
years old 








Table 3. RE Regression Estimates of Select Variables on Net Income Inequality (Gini Coefficient x 100): 16 Countries 1970 to 2010 
 Models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Democratic State        




    -0.197** 
(0.072) 
    Generosity of Welfare Benefits  -0.433*** 
(0.072) 
    -0.272*** 
(0.063) 
Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining        




  -0.049** 
(0.017) 
    Centralized Wage Bargaining 
 
   -3.188* 
(1.689) 
  -4.931*** 
(1.310) 
    Policy Bargaining    -2.372*** 
(.564) 
  -0.096  
(.470) 
        
Gender and Family        


















        














        
Number of Observations 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
R2 (within) .193 .250 .231 .402 .147 .172 .602 
R2 (between) .596 .839 .644 .847 .485 .711 .971 
R2 (overall) .498 .721 .531 .742 .353 .566 .898 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001.  Each model includes unreported year-dummy variables. 
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Table 4 . Measures of Net Income Inequality and Protective Institutions for 16 Advanced Capitalist  

















United States 37.28 16.02 12.07 69.72 20.57 
 United Kingdom 35.27 20.97 28.12 69.04 21.70 
 Italy 33.05 19.76 34.05 50.06 6.70 
 Canada 31.62 19.70 29.99 72.72 13.96 
 Australia 31.45 17.49 20.97 68.42 16.82 
 Ireland 30.40 17.04 34.51 60.62 18.15 
 Belgium 27.90 22.74 51.72 58.84 10.34 
 France 27.90 23.36 7.79 66.12 9.10 
 Germany 27.95 18.93 21.45 67.33 15.18 
 Switzerland 27.40 11.30 19.51 78.58 7.25 
 Austria 26.30 18.70 32.41 66.01 12.08 
 Netherlands 26.30 24.88 21.78 68.58 9.32 
 Norway 24.45 20.65 54.30 75.82 13.83 
 Finland 25.20 22.34 72.76 72.74 12.65 
 Sweden 24.45 26.44 75.63 76.19 17.94 
 Denmark 23.48 26.66 70.94 76.06 15.61 
 
       Average  29.04 20.45 36.26 68.64 14.07 
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Figure 2: Scatter Plots and Correlation Coefficients for Key Variables and Income Inequality:  
16 Advanced Capitalist Countries, 1970 to 2010. 
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